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Abstract: Modular inversions are widely employed in public key crypto-systems, and it is known that
they imply a bottleneck due to the expensive computation. Recently, a new algorithm for inversions
modulo pk was proposed, which may speed up the calculation of a modulus dependent quantity
used in the Montgomery multiplication. The original algorithm lacks security countermeasures;
thus, a straightforward implementation may expose the input. This is an issue if that input is a secret.
In the RSA-CRT signature using Montgomery multiplication, the moduli are secrets (primes p and q).
Therefore, the moduli dependent quantities related to p and q must be securely computed. This paper
presents a security analysis of the novel method considering that it might be used to compute
secrets. We demonstrate that a Side Channel Analysis leads to disclose the data being manipulated.
In consequence, a secure variant for inversions modulo 2k is proposed, through the application of
two known countermeasures. In terms of performance, the secure variant is still comparable with the
original one.
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1. Introduction
Public key cryptographic schemes often require performing modular inversions, which are known
to be expensive operations. In RSA, for example, the secret key is obtained through the inversion
of the public key. In ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm), to generate a digital
signature, the per-message random secret is inverted after the scalar multiplication. Fermat’s, Euler’s
and Euclidean’s methods are the most well-known solutions to compute a multiplicative inverse.
Derived from Euclid’s method, the Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm (BEEA) is very efficient as
it substitutes multi-precision divisions by right shifts. This is a suitable approach for software and
hardware realizations [1]. However, a straightforward BEEA implementation is susceptible to Side
Channel Analysis (SCA) [2,3].
Recently, a very efficient algorithm to compute the multiplicative inverse modulo pk has been
introduced by Koç in [4]. The new inversion method has a low computational complexity. This is a
clear advantage, since cryptographic implementations usually manipulate large numbers. A special
case of the algorithm is the computation modulo 2k. This is especially useful to compute the required
modular inverse in a Montgomery multiplication [5]. The method, however, is clearly not intended
to manipulate sensitive data, as it will be analyzed in next sections. Therefore, a straightforward
implementation should be avoided, for example, in the Chinese Remainder Theorem variant of
RSA (RSA-CRT).
Some other approaches had been previously introduced to compute the inverse modulo 2k [6,7].
Those algorithms do not seem either intended to manipulate secrets and their performance is lower
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compared to the new one (see the algorithms comparison given in [4]). Thus, we focus this work in the
analysis of the new inversion method, because a secure version of it may be a suitable candidate to be
used in low power devices with cryptographic capabilities.
1.1. RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplications
RSA is an asymmetric cryptosystem that allows both encryption and signing [8]. The cryptosystem
is still a widely used standard, even in financial sector products like smart cards [9]. Despite its age,
there are works that recently addressed some security research on RSA implementations [10–12].
RSA signature of message m, by using the private key d can be written as
S = mdmod N (1)
where N is a public modulus compound by the multiplication of two secret primes (N = p · q). As N
is a large number, the modular exponentiation is a costly operation. RSA-CRT variant is preferred for
efficiency reasons. As p and q are both smaller than N, residue-based arithmetic (modulo p and q)
allows working with shorter registers, and then, the exponentiation complexity gets reduced by signing
the message following
Sp = mdpmod p (2)
Sq = mdqmod q (3)
where dp and dq are the residues of the private key modulo p and q, respectively.
In Equations (2) and (3), two partial signatures are obtained. To give a unified result, these
values need to be joined. The recombination methods of Gauss and Garner are well known to do that.
Garner’s recombination (below) is often preferred for being more efficient than Gauss’s method.
S = Sq + q · (q−1 · (Sp − Sq) mod p) (4)
The main advantage of the Montgomery multiplication (see Algorithm 1) is the substitution
of divisions by right shifts and modular reductions by truncations. Because of that simplification,
this method is commonly used to solve the modular multiplications involved in the exponentiation.
Algorithm 1: MontgomeryMult
Input: a, b, n, r, n′; such that n < 2k and r = 2k
Output: u = a · b · r−1mod n
1. t = a · b
2. m = t · n′ (mod r)
3. u = (t+m · n)/r
4. if u ≥ n
5. u = u− n
6. return u
Even when the output is multiplied by r−1, Algorithm 1 works with an n′, which is such that
2k · r−1 − n · n′ = 1. Therefore, the calculation of n′ can be given by n′ = −n−1mod 2k. In the case
of the standard RSA, the modulus N is public; however, in RSA-CRT the partial exponentiations are
calculated using moduli p and q, which are both secrets. The analogue calculations of n′ in RSA-CRT
would be
p′ = −p−1mod 2k (5)
q′ = −q−1mod 2k (6)
where k is such that 2k−1 < p, q < 2k . The usage of a non-protected algorithm for the calculation of n′
in a standard RSA does not imply any risk. On the contrary, for the RSA-CRT, if p′ and q′ need to be
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computed, it should be done more carefully, because the secret primes are directly involved. Actually,
if p and q are dynamically masked (pm and qm) at each RSA-CRT computation, as it commonly occurs
in banking products, the Montgomery constants p′m and q′m will be different every time and they
should always be computed.
1.2. Our Contributions
In this work, we conduct a security evaluation of the new inversion method proposed by Koç.
We demonstrate that the algorithm lacks security countermeasures, and then a straightforward
implementation of it may compromise a secret if it is being manipulated. A secure and still efficient
variant for the computation of the inverse modulo 2k is proposed herein. It includes countermeasures
that allows handling sensitive data in a safe mode, as needed in the case of RSA-CRT with
Montgomery multiplication.
1.3. Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 an introduction to the topic is given. Section 2
describes the inversion method under study. In Section 3 a security analysis is conducted for the special
case of inversions modulo 2k, where two vulnerabilities are discussed. In Section 4 the countermeasures
to patch the vulnerabilities are described and a SCA-protected variant of the algorithm is presented.
Finally, Conclusions and References are listed.
2. On a New Algorithm for Inversion Modulo pk
The algorithm introduced in [4] focuses on the need for the public key cryptographic schemes to
perform modular inverse operations. The new method to compute x = a−1mod pk seems to be quite
efficient and it works for any p and any k. The assumptions to perform the computation are:
• p is a prime
• k is a positive integer
• gcd(a, p) = 1 (1 < a < pk)
p is usually a small number (commonly 2 or 3), thus the computation at step 1 is expected to be
easily performed. In fact, for the case of p = 2, the computation of c is trivial. A better comprehension
of Algorithm 2 and its demonstrations, can be obtained from the work in [4].
Algorithm 2: Modular Inverse [mod pk]
Input: a, p and k; such that gcd(a, p) = 1 and a < pk
Output: x = a−1mod pk
1. c = a−1mod p
2. b0 = 1
3. for i = 0 to k− 1
4. Xi = c · bi mod p
5. bi+1 = (bi − a · Xi)/p
6. return x = (Xk−1. . . . . .X1X0)p
Special case p = 2
In the previous section, we discussed the Montgomery constant computation, and it was
highlighted the need for the modular inverse in that process. As from Equations (5) and (6) for
the RSA-CRT cryptosystem, the said inverse is computed modulo 2k which is a particular case of
modulo pk where p = 2.
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Algorithm 2 can be reduced if p = 2 to compute the inverse modulo 2k. In this case,
the computation of x = a−1mod 2k requires that gcd(a, 2k) = 1, thus a must be an odd number
and then c = 1.
From Algorithm 3 one appreciates that the operation at step 3 is trivial, as it only requires
checking the LSB of bi. On the other hand, the returned value in x is binary. The simplified algorithm
for p = 2 follows
Algorithm 3: Modular Inverse [mod 2k]
Input: a and 2k; such that a < 2k and a is odd
Output: x = a−1mod 2k
1. b0 = 1
2. for i = 0 to k− 1
3. Xi = bi mod 2
4. bi+1 = (bi − a · Xi)/2
5. return x = (Xk−1. . . . . .X1X0)2
3. Security Analysis for p = 2
Side Channel Analysis techniques have been introduced in the late 1990s by Kocher [13].
An effective attack leads to disclose sensitive data being manipulated by a cryptographic device,
through the leakage associated with its power consumption. One of such techniques is the Simple
Power Analysis (SPA). Through an SPA, one can observe the sequence of operations, or one can even
distinguish an operation from another one by the differences in their power consumption patterns.
The observation of a power consumption trace may also give a clue of the operation latency, which is
closely related to the bit length of the operands. This applies mainly for sequential operations. In the
following subsections we describe two vulnerabilities found in the inversion algorithm under analysis,
that impede a safely manipulation of secrets.
3.1. Asymmetric Iterations
It is well known that the Square-and-Multiply method to compute y = gk allows to recover
k through an SPA, due to a difference in the operations performed whether k = 0 or k = 1.
The Montgomery ladder exponentiation solves that issue by performing the same operations at
every iteration of the algorithm [14].
A similar issue has been detected in the inversion method under analysis in this work. It allows
a straightforward SPA, which leads to an easy recovery of the operation result, and in consequence,
the input data is disclosed. As from the previous section, the modular inverse of the input a,
obtained through Algorithm 3 is formed by x = (Xk−1...X1X0)2; where Xi ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore,
the intermediate result bi − a · Xi at step 4 is always divisible by 2. At step 4, besides the multiplication
a · Xi, two other operations can be distinguished: a subtraction and a division by 2. The division can
be performed as a right shift because the result of the subtraction is always divisible by 2.
Regarding the subtraction, this may or may not be computed. One can see that if Xi = 0,
then a ·Xi = 0, and then the subtraction bi− a ·Xi becomes bi− 0. In a straightforward implementation
of the original algorithm, the developer may choose to obviate the subtraction if Xi = 0. We recall that
the original work does not refer to any SCA protection to keep the input data safe, thus we believe the
author did not consider a scenario with a secret input. If the subtraction is not performed, a significant
difference in the execution flow exists depending on the Xi value. In summary
Xi = 0 → bi+1 = (bi − a · Xi)/2 = bi/2
Xi = 1 → bi+1 = (bi − a · Xi)/2 = (bi − a)/2
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Such a data-dependant characteristic could be distinguished in a power consumption trace of the
algorithm execution. It then leads to a straightforward SPA where the modular inverse of the secret
could be directly recovered. Once the modular inverse is recovered, it is then trivial to obtain the
input by computing a = x−1mod 2k. If a was a secret, as it is the case in the Montgomery constants
computation for RSA-CRT, this would imply a critical security issue.
However, the developer may choose a more regular implementation by always computing the
subtraction. In this case, there are two possibilities: if Xi = 0, the subtraction bi− 0 is computed, while if
Xi = 1, it will be computed bi − a. The operands bi and a are large integers since the second iteration,
in the context of the Montgomery constants computation for RSA-CRT. It makes the subtraction bi − a
highly susceptible of having lots of carry bits propagation. This effect has a negative impact on the
latency of the addition/subtraction. While in bi − 0 the carry propagation is null, in bi − a the carry
propagation varies making that operation longer in time. This should be enough to apply a Timing
Attack to distinguish one operation from the other, which directly leads to infer the values of the
related Xi.
3.2. Operations Latency
The latency of the arithmetic operations is closely related to the data length of the operands,
especially in software implementations. In RSA, for example, the exponentiation latency is expected to
be proportional to the key length. In the case of additions/subtractions, they both commonly require
to manage a carry bit that can be generated at each bit-bit operation. Therefore, the carry chain is as
long as the operands, and it determines the whole operation latency.
Let us say, for example, that the evenness of an operand determines the next operation where
it will be involved, and the said operation impacts on the operand’s bit length. If that quantity
is further added or subtracted from a constant value and this sequence is performed in a loop,
the addition/subtraction latency might experiment variations at each iteration, as a consequence of
the carry chain modification. If an adversary is able to identify the additions/subtractions through
an SPA and measure those variations, then the operand’s evenness (its Least Significant Bit—LSB—)
might be traced back.
From Algorithm 3, one can see that the subtraction at the step 4 depends on bi and a. The value
of a is invariant throughout the whole operation, while bi does varies. In fact, the value of bi is
strongly dependent on Xi. If Xi = 0, then bi+1, computed at iteration i, yields bi/2. For consecutive
Xi = 0, the respective bi+1 are always smaller by a factor of 2. On the other hand, considering a < 0
(as required in the Montgomery constant computation), it can be demonstrated that bi+1 tends to a for
consecutive Xi = 1.
Let’s have Xi = Xi+1 = 1. The correspondent calculations of bi and bi+1 follow
bi = bi−1/2+ a/2 (7)
bi+1 = bi−1/4+ 3a/4 (8)
According to the right side of Equation (8) and comparing it with the right side of Equation (7),
the second fraction (which depends on a) in (8) is greater and it approaches more to a. Meanwhile,
the first fraction is halved and tends to zero. Thus, it makes bi+1 closer to a rather than to bi. Something
similar occurs when Xi = 0 and Xi+1 = 1.
In summary, we might then expect to observe in a power trace, a continuous decreasing latency
in the addition/subtraction for consecutive iterations where Xi = 0; while the latency would tend to
increase for continuous Xi = 1 or even for transitions from Xi = 0 to Xi+1 = 1.
The differences in the execution flow for the cases Xi = 0 and Xi = 1, presented in the previous
section, are enough to perform an SPA on Algorithm 2. Thus, a timing analysis for this purpose
is not necessary; however, in order to design a countermeasure to overcome such data-dependent
vulnerability, the issue on the operations timing has to be taken into account.
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4. A Secure Method for Inversion Modulo 2k
Considering the issues found in the previous section, a secure variant of Algorithm 3 is proposed
herein (See Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4: Secure Modular Inverse [mod 2k]
Input: a and 2k; such that a < 2k and a is odd
Output: x = a−1mod 2k
1. b0 = 1+ 2k
2. for i = 0 to k− 1
3. bi = bi + 2k
4. Xi = bi mod 2
5. if Xi = 0
6. bi+1 = bi/2
7. b f = (bi − a)/2
8. else [if Xi = 1]
9. b f = bi/2
10. bi+1 = (bi − a)/2
11. return x = (Xk−1. . . . . .X1X0)2
Our new variant resists both SPA and Timing Attacks with a minimum overhead; therefore, it can
be used to obtain the multiplicative inverse of odd secrets modulo 2k. Moreover, the low complexity of
the countermeasures applied makes this algorithm suitable to be implemented in low power devices.
In our algorithm, two conditional branches have been included for the cases of Xi = 0 and Xi = 1
respectively. They both compute the same operations, in the same order, with the current values of bi.
Dummy operations have been introduced in both branches to balance them. The variable b f holds
the useless result derived from the dummy operation. This simple countermeasure follows the same
strategy as in the Montgomery ladder and impedes the recognition of Xi through an SPA.
Moreover, the subtraction bi − a is executed for all Xi, and even in the fake case, the operation
manipulates the actual value of bi. Following the analysis in Section 3.2, the subtraction latency depends
on bi, which varies in every iteration depending on Xi. Thus, it can be said that, for every iteration,
the latency of bi − a depends on Xi. Therefore, a constant bit length of bi (that implies a constant
carry chain length in bi − a) is a must so that the subtraction has the same latency throughout the
whole execution.
Previously, it was seen that bi+1 decreases if Xi = 0, and that bi+1 tends to a for continuous Xi = 1.
As a < 2k, it has at most k bits and so has bi. When a < 0 (as in the Montgomery constant computation),
the operation bi − a becomes an addition. In such cases bi+1 might have at most k+ 1 bits, considering
the carry.
To get Xi at step 4, the evenness of bi is evaluated. If an even value is added to bi, it will not affect
bi’s evenness. On the other hand, if a number v = 2k+1 is added to bi, it will not affect the first k+ 1
bits of the operation result at steps 7 and 10.
Following this reasoning, Xi at step 4 could be evaluated with bi + 2k+1 and then
bi+1 = (bi + 2k+1 − a)/2. Please note that, as the algorithm evaluates only k bits of the resultant
bi, the Most Significant Bit (MSB), at position k+ 1, will have no effect on the result. Table 1 gives a
detailed view of this.
In the algorithm, the loop first gets a bi of k+ 2 bits, where its MSB is ‘1’. After the subtractions at
steps 7 and 10, a division by 2 is carried out. It makes the MSB to shift one bit right to occupy the 2k
position. This is compensated in the next iteration, at the step 3, by adding 2k so that bi has k+ 2 bits
again; it is, with the MSB in the 2k+1 position.
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Table 1. Addition a+ bi not affected by the summand 2k+1.
2k+1 2k 2k−1 ... 21 20
a - - 1 ... x x
bi - - 1 ... x x
a+ bi - 1 x ... x x
v 1 0 0 ... 0 0
a+ bi + v 1 1 x ... x x
The starting point was that bi different bit lengths may cause a latency variation in the subtractions,
and it may lead to infer the previous value of Xi. By adding 2k+1 to bi, it guarantees that subtractions at
steps 7 and 10 are always performed with operands of constant bit length. At step 3, bi will always have
k+ 1 bits, so the addition bi = bi + 2k will always be performed with constant bit length operands too.
Furthermore, the right shifts at steps 6 and 9 will be carried out with bi having fixed k+ 2 bits length.
Secure Variant Overhead
The proposed variant herein implies no significant overhead in comparison with the original
algorithm. The count of operations of the original inversion method yields one addition. This is true
if we dismiss the bi evenness check and the division by 2. Our algorithm does not add any further
addition. In fact, the operation at step 3 may be coded in a few ways, but in any case, it is only needed
to manipulate the most significant byte of bi to set the bit in the 2k+1 position (see Table 1).
5. Conclusions
The analysis performed on the original inversion algorithm for modulo 2k led us to establish
a direct relationship between the output data bits and the execution flow. In consequence,
we demonstrated that the modular inverse of a secret could be revealed by an SPA conducted on a
single power consumption trace.
A timing analysis was also carried out, specifically on the subtraction operation. It was concluded
that the bit length of bi may affect the latency of subtractions, and because the bit length is related to
the factor Xi, a direct relationship could also be established between the sensitive output data and the
latency of the subtractions.
Having this into account, a secure variant of the original inversion algorithm was proposed.
By solving the security issues described, the protected algorithm allows to manipulate secret values,
as it is the case in the Montgomery constants computation for RSA-CRT. The secure method is resistant
to SPA and Timing attacks. Furthermore, the overhead of the applied countermeasures implies no
significant lack of performance respect to the original algorithm.
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